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1 Tel.: +33 1 01 45 36 18 80.The paper builds a belief hierarchy as a framework common to all uncertainty measures
expressing that an actor is ambiguous about his uncertain beliefs. The belief hierarchy is
further interpreted by distinguishing physical and psychical worlds, associated to objective
and subjective probabilities. Various rules of transformation of a belief hierarchy are intro-
duced, especially changing subjective beliefs into objective ones. These principles are
applied in order to relate different contexts of belief change, revising, updating and even
focusing. The numerous belief change rules already proposed in the literature receive
epistemic justiﬁcations by associating them to speciﬁc belief hierarchies and change con-
texts. As a result, it is shown that the resiliency of probability judgments may have some
limits and be reconciled with the possibility of learning from factual messages.
 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc.0. Introduction
According to Lewis [20], the subjectivists conceive probability as ‘‘the measure of reasonable partial belief” of some agent.
However, and contrary to some ‘‘strong Bayesian” thesis [30], simple probability measures are not enough to represent this
partial belief. In ‘‘ambiguity” contexts, the agent is uncertain about the relevant probabilities and may use probabilities over
probabilities implicitly [7,10] or explicitly [2,18,26,27]. Some other uncertainty measures, such as Dempster–Shafer belief
functions [23] or families of probability functions (e.g. [32]) have also been proposed to give a richer or sounder approach
of some of our uncertainty judgments. These uncertainty measures may be formally linked (e.g. [6]) and present strong sim-
ilarities concerning their epistemic interpretation. Hence, a ﬁrst aim of the paper is to propose a common framework for all
these models in order to go beyond their competition and to show that each representation stems from a unique reasoning
model applied in different contexts. The tool for building this common framework will be a hierarchy of beliefs, in which set-
theoretic and probabilistic levels between possible worlds are combined.
As put by Lewis [20] after Carnap [5], subjectivists may also consider as relevant objective probabilities, or ‘‘chances”.
When tossing a coin or considering radioactive decay, objective probabilities may be or must be considered as objects of be-
lief. Even if believing in a precise objective probability remains a subjective matter, it is as reasonable to deal with objective
probabilities as properties of the external world as it is for the length or the speed of an object [29]. From a subjectivist point
of view, belief in the value of an objective probability implies for instance to believe in the possibility of a convergence be-
tween the subjective probabilities concerning an event among different agents, which would not be the case if only pure
subjective probabilities were involved. Hence, a second aim of the paper is to draw consequences from the assumption that
an agent may use objective and subjective probabilities, especially when revising uncertainty measures. The formal beliefy Elsevier Inc.
iser), dzwirn@numilog.com (D. Zwirn).
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ciples grounded on that distinction.
It is generally considered that no ‘‘admissible evidence” can ever refute a probability measure, since any data are always
compatible with it. Nevertheless, several change rules – like Bayesian conditioning or Lewisian imaging – were proposed in
order to learn from experience [13,15]. These rules may be justiﬁed by pure algebraic properties or by decision theory argu-
ments such as Dutch books. But they may be justiﬁed too by purely epistemic axioms in speciﬁc change contexts [31]. When
considering the more sophisticated uncertainty measures quoted before, several change rules were already proposed: Demp-
ster, Fagin–Halpern, Gilboa-Schmeidler, Suppes-Zanotti, Jaffray. However, these rules were again justiﬁed only by some alge-
braic properties and their speciﬁc application domains remain unclear. Hence, a third aim of the paper is to justify the use of
these various change rules by pure epistemic arguments which link them to a speciﬁc type of belief hierarchy and to a spe-
ciﬁc belief change context. The proposed belief hierarchy is able to deal not only with the two usual change contexts, revising
and updating, but also allows to consider a third one, focusing. Finally, the paper shows how to reconcile the resiliency of
probability judgments and the intuition of the possibility of learning from factual messages.
Section 1 presents a formal belief hierarchy and represents in a same framework several uncertainty measures that have
been distinguished in the literature. Section 2 introduces the interpreted belief hierarchy elaborated through the distinction
between subjective and objective worlds. Section 3 suggests a further interpretation of a hierarchy, as either populational or
causal, the last one being reducible to the ﬁrst one. Section 4 proposes some reduction principles and Section 5 some trans-
formation principles between belief hierarchies, especially between psychical and physical structural elements. Section 6 re-
calls the different belief change contexts that may be considered, the belief hierarchy framework leading to consider a third
one, focusing, besides revising and updating. Section 7 suggests an equivalence principle between change contexts which can
be used in order to derive belief change rules in one context from another one. Sections 8–10 are devoted to the justiﬁcations
of the usual belief change rules for speciﬁc belief hierarchies and respectively for updating, revising and focusing. Section 11
gives an synthetic account of the belief change rules for the simplest hierarchies. Section 12 proposes an analysis, backed by
the previous construction, of the relation between resiliency and learning.
1. Formal belief hierarchy
A belief hierarchy is stated in a semantic framework and more precisely in a possible worlds one. It is constituted of a
ﬁnite sequence of layers, each layer k 2 f0;1; . . . ;ng being formed of a set Wk of k-worlds. The sequence describes the set
W0 of basic worlds (or 0-worlds), the set W1 of meta-worlds (or 1-worlds) till a ﬁnal set Wn composed of only one world
(a n-world). A relation Rk is deﬁned between any two layers k and k  1, and deﬁnes the level k. A level may be of two dif-
ferent kinds [4]:
– a set-theoretic level, where each k-world is linked to a given subset of (k  1)-worlds constituting an event;
– a probabilistic level, where each k-world is linked to all (k  1)-worlds by a probabilistic distribution on them.
A two-level hierarchy may be of four different types, by combination of the two possible kinds of levels. However, only
the three really interesting ones are studied in the literature (the structure with set-theoretic levels twice being trivial):
– a distribution of distributions, where a 2-world deﬁnes a probability distribution on 1-worlds, each 1-world deﬁning a
probability distribution on 0-worlds;
– a family of distributions, where a 2-world deﬁnes a set of 1-worlds, each 1-world deﬁning a probability distribution on 0-
world;
– a distribution of events, where a 2-world deﬁnes a probability distribution on 1-worlds, each 1-world deﬁning a set of 0-
worlds.
For instance, the following structures can be considered, where the probability distribution is replaced by its support in
order to translate a probabilistic layer into a set-theoretic one, and where l > k > 0:
A belief hierarchy offers a common framework for representing several non-probabilistic measures of uncertainty that
have been proposed in the literature. More precisely, a lower and an upper value can be associated to any event E formed
of basic worlds. It is obtained by proceeding recursively from bottom layer 0 to top layer n. In each 0-world, the lower
(upper) value of event E is given by its characteristic function (value 1 if the world belongs to it and 0 else). In any k-world,
when the relation Rk is set-theoretic, the lower (upper) value of E is the maximum (minimum) of the lower (upper) values
taken for all the (k  1)-worlds in the associated set. When the relation Rk is probabilistic, the lower (upper) value of E is the
expected value of the lower (upper) values taken for all (k  1)-worlds probabilistically associated to it. Moreover, two hier-
archical structures are said to be ‘‘value-equivalent” if they give the same lower and upper values to any basic event E, these
values being considered from the point of view of the unique n-world of the top layer.
For instance, given a distribution of events, the lower and upper values are respectively the ‘‘credibility” and ‘‘plausibil-
ity”, i.e. the dual values of the Dempster–Shafer belief functions [23,24]. Conversely, the distribution of events is recovered as
the Moebius transform of the values for any event E. Similarly, given a family of distributions, the lower and upper values are
respectively the ‘‘lower probability” and ‘‘upper probability”, i.e. the lower and upper envelope of the family. Conversely, the
family of distributions is recovered as the ‘‘core” of the values for any event E. As well known, a credibility function is always
value-equivalent to some lower probability function, the converse being true under some speciﬁc conditions on the dual val-
ues [6]. These measures are not to be conceived as direct alternatives to the Bayesian standard probability representation,
but rather as the results of higher order uncertainty, which may combine the elementary probabilistic representation with
an elementary set-theoretic representation.
In the preceding example, the three structures S1, S2, S3 are respectively value-equivalent to the following ones, the
ﬁrst being obtained by collapsing the two levels of probabilities and the last two by using the previous value-
equivalence:
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Hierarchical belief structures were already studied formally in a set-theoretic framework by Fagin et al. [12]. In fact, they
consider several players who hold crossed beliefs about some material world. Hence, at all layers except layer 0, the worlds
are assumed to reﬂect mental states of the agents while at layer 0, the worlds represent their material environment. In our
framework with only one agent, any hierarchy is similarly interpreted by considering that it reﬂects the belief of an agent on
some material system. However, two types of worlds, which may be present at any layer, are considered:
– a physical world (represented by a square) corresponds to a material state of the represented system;
– a psychical world (represented by a circle) corresponds to an epistemic mental state of the ongoing agent.
Moreover, it is assumed that the worlds are of same type at each layer. Four types of levels can be considered by
combination:
– a physical (k + 1)-world is linked to physical k-worlds: a material system is constituted of similar subsystems or pos-
sesses comparable properties;
– a psychical (k + 1)-world is linked to physical k-worlds: an agent has alternative beliefs about the material system;
– a psychical (k + 1)-world is linked to psychical k-worlds: an agent’s belief is deﬁned on more basic beliefs of the same
agent;
– a physical (k + 1)-world is linked to psychical k-worlds: a material object exercises some inﬂuence on the agent’s belief.
In fact, the last type is excluded in the present framework. According to an ‘‘epistemic principle”, we focus our analysis on
beliefs representing a material system, but not on the causal inﬂuence of this material system on beliefs. Let us quote Lewis
[20]: ‘‘Chance of credence need not to detain us. It may be partly a matter of a chance what one comes to believe, but what of
it?”.
B. Walliser, D. Zwirn / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 166–183 169Likewise, the penultimate type is strongly constrained. According to a so called ‘‘no-schizophrenia principle”, we assume
that an agent cannot adopt a belief formed of several alternative beliefs on a material system. The intuition lying behind
this principle is that, if an agent may well hesitate between his own past or future beliefs or between the present beliefs of
other agents, he cannot hesitate between his own present beliefs. However, he may adopt a belief about his unique belief.
Indeed, let us imagine that an agent hesitates between the fact that he believes that a ball is red or the fact that he believes
that it is blue; hence he does not strictly believe neither that it is red nor that it is blue; hence he cannot hesitate between
the facts that he has one of these beliefs. This intuition can be made more formal and the principle proved in a set-theo-
retic framework within epistemic logics (see Appendix A), for an agent who satisﬁes logical omniscience (the agent be-
lieves all consequences of what he believes), positive introspection (when the agent believes something, he believes
that he believes it) and negative introspection (when the agent does not believe something, he believes that he does
not believe it).
Since we are interested in beliefs on a material system, layer 0 has to be formed of material worlds and level n has to be a
psychical world. It results that a belief hierarchy is characterized by a reference layer r such that all layers strictly above r are
psychical and all layers under r are physical. Moreover, the psychical levels above the lowest one have to be mono-dimen-
sional (only one line). The lines between two layers represent probabilistic or set-theoretic relations (which may change
from one level to another). If the interpretation will generally be given for a probabilistic level, it applies as well to a set-the-
oretic one.3. Interpreted relations
The upper levels (running from layer r to layer n) reﬂect the beliefs of an agent (psychical part). The lower levels (running
from layer 0 to layer r > 0) reﬂect the nature of the material system under consideration (physical part). For the last, two
interpretations of the relations are possible. In a populational interpretation, one has to consider objects, populations of ob-
jects, populations of populations (meta-populations) of objects and so on. In a causal interpretation, one has to consider ob-
jects, properties of objects, properties of properties of objects (meta-properties) and so on. For two-level hierarchies, each
interpretation will be associated with two prototypical examples, one concerned with the belief of an agent about the color
of a ball, the other concerned with the belief of a physician about the disease of a patient.
The ﬁrst interpretation of the hierarchy is ‘‘populational” since it considers that the agent holds a belief concerning a r-
population of objects. In a two-level hierarchy, layer 0 is formed of basic properties of the objects, layer 1 of a population of
objects, layer 2 of the belief about the possible composition of the population. A ‘‘generic object” is deﬁned as a virtual object
about which the agent’s belief reﬂects his assessment about the population of ‘‘speciﬁc objects”. For instance, layer 0 is
formed of colored balls, layer 1 of urns with different compositions (of different generic balls), layer 2 of the belief about
the possible compositions of the urn (about generic balls). Likewise, layer 0 is formed of ill patients, layer 1 of populations
of these patients with various distributions of diseases (of different generic patients), layer 2 of a belief about the possible
distributions of diseases (of different generic patients). Bacchus [3] proposes a predicate logic in which this distinction be-
tween generic events (‘‘event types”) and speciﬁc ones (‘‘event tokens”) is formally represented.
The second interpretation of the hierarchy is ‘‘causal” since it considers that the agent holds a belief about the multiple
conditions or causal factors for the properties of a given object. In a two-level hierarchy, layer 0 is composed of basic prop-
erties of the object, layer 1 of secondary or meta-properties of that object, layer 2 of the belief of the agent concerning all the
combinations of properties of the object. A ‘‘conditional object” is deﬁned as a virtual object about which the agent’s belief
reﬂects his assessment about the meta-properties of objects. For instance, layer 0 is formed by the different colors (blue, yel-
low, red) of a ball, layer 1 the different shapes (cubic, spheric) which are related in given ways to the colors (of conditional
balls) and layer 2 of the belief about the possible shapes of the ball (possible conditional balls). Likewise, layer 0 is formed of
the different symptoms, i.e. (no spots & fever), (spots & fever), (spots & no fever), (no spots & no fever), layer 1 of the diseases
(bronchitis, inﬂuenza) which are related in given ways to the symptoms (of conditional patients), layer 2 of the belief about
the different diseases (about conditional patients).
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the degrees of belief of an agent. They correspond to Lewis’s [20] credence or to Carnap’s [5] probability1. Objective proba-
bilities reﬂect a property that the agent attributes to the material system. They correspond to what is often labeled as
‘‘chance” in the literature (for instance, [20] and probability2 by Carnap [5]. In a belief hierarchy, for a populational interpre-
tation, these probabilities are clearly involved in speciﬁc levels. Objective probabilities appear at the lower levels (physical
part) and reﬂect real ‘‘properties” attributed by the agent to the distribution of objects. Subjective probabilities appear at the
upper levels (psychical part) and reﬂect the beliefs of the agent on the distribution of objects. Moreover, when one considers
a speciﬁc object, objective probabilities are necessarily 0 or 1: a speciﬁc ball is or is not blue. But the agent may be uncertain
about the probabilities that an object has such and such property: a speciﬁc ball is considered as blue with a probability be-
tween 0 and 1. Objective probabilities between 0 and 1 can only concern objects of higher levels: they deal with a generic
ball in an urn.
In the populational interpretation, the probabilities express the ‘‘proportion” of objects of each type in the urns and can be
linked to the frequentist interpretation of probabilities if one considers that frequencies are converging in the long run to
these proportions. In the causal interpretation, the objective probabilities express the ‘propensity’ of the object to instantiate
some property [22]. The causal interpretation can be reduced to a populational one by considering all objects sharing a meta-
property as belonging to a same population. This is why the populational interpretation will be privileged now. Especially,
the prototypical example will be a hierarchy of balls, urns and meta-urns.
4. Reduction of hierarchies
The problem of reducing two levels into a single one concerns ﬁrst two psychical levels. One can apply to belief hierar-
chies the ideas associated in epistemic logic to the positive introspection axiom (when an agent believes something, he be-
lieves that he believes it) and to the truth axiom (when an agent believes that he believes something, he believes it). For a
belief hierarchy, these two symmetric principles are respectively expressed as follows:
– the ‘‘extension principle” asserts that a belief hierarchy of level n is equivalent to an extended one, the belief hierarchy of
level (n + 1), obtained by adding a psychical world of level n + 1 which is linked only to the initial psychical world of level n
of the former hierarchy;
– the ‘‘reduction principle” asserts that a belief hierarchy of level (n + 1) where the psychical world of level n + 1 is linked
only to one psychical world of level n, is equivalent to a truncated one, the belief hierarchy obtained by deleting the psy-
chical world of level n + 1.
It is now possible to consider that only one psychical level is needed. The n-level hierarchies where the psychical n-world
is linked to several physical r-worlds (with r = n  1) are called Tn. The n-level hierarchies where the psychical n-world is
linked to a unique r-world (with r = n  1) are called T*n. Hence, the simplest structure that may be considered when mixing
formal belief hierarchies, interpretation of worlds and the reduction principle is the 1-level belief hierarchy T1 (n = 1, r = 0)
where the agent holds an uncertain belief about the property of a given object. A slightly more complex structure is a re-
stricted 2-level hierarchy T*2 (n = 2, r = 1) where the agent has a ‘‘certain belief” about some population formed of objects
with a given property. The next structure is the general two-level hierarchy T2 (n = 2, r = 1) which describes a situation in
which the agent holds an uncertain belief about some population formed of objects with a given property.
For instance, consider a belief about a speciﬁc ball, a certain belief about an urn with balls, an uncertain belief about an
urn with balls (a ball is blue B, yellow Y or red R):
The problem of reducing two levels into a single one concerns now two physical levels. The ‘‘collapse principle” states that
it is possible to collapse them into a ‘‘synthetic structure” since the initial and ﬁnal structures are value-equivalent. Such an
operation is clearly possible when the two levels are homogenous, i.e. both set-theoretic or both probabilistic; in the last
case, the (objective) probability distribution in the synthetic structure is obtained by composition of the (objective) proba-
bilities of the two intermediate levels. However, when the two levels are heterogeneous, i.e. one set-theoretic and one prob-
abilistic, the composition of the synthetic urn can no more be computed for technical reasons.
For instance, a meta-urn formed of urns containing balls can be reduced to a ‘‘synthetic urn”, which gives the same value
to each basic event:
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prior principle allows for such a reduction. But such a reduction will become possible with further principles (see Section 5).5. Transformation of hierarchies
The equivalence between physical and psychical levels has been analyzed in the literature in the case of probabilistic lev-
els, but applies as well to set-theoretic ones. A ‘‘subjectivation principle” asserts that if an agent is aware of the objective
distribution of a given system, he may endorse the objective probability of an occurrence and adopt it as his subjective prob-
ability for that occurrence. This principle is exactly what is expressed by the Miller principle [21], the Principal Principle of
Lewis [20], the constraint C2 stated by Skyrms [26] or the Expert function of van Fraassen [30]. By the same operation, in a
populational interpretation, the ‘‘speciﬁcation principle” asserts that a belief about a generic object of a system is trans-
formed into a belief about a speciﬁc object of the system. This principle formally transforms a physical world into a psychical
one, hence lowers the reference level of the hierarchical belief structure.
The idea common to the subjectivation principle and to the speciﬁcation principle will be called the ‘‘projection princi-
ple”. For instance, it transforms a hierarchy T*2 into a hierarchy T1 in two steps. In a ﬁrst step, the objective layer is trans-
formed in a subjective one, the agent facing a belief hierarchy where he is certain to hold a belief corresponding to the
objective structure. In a second step, the truth principle allows to eliminate the second subjective level:The subjectivation principle may be reversed in an ‘‘objectivation principle” which states that the subjective probability of
an object is considered as stemming from an objective (virtual) probability. It is just a reversal of the Miller Principle, where
the agent forms in his mind the idea of an objective phenomenon from which his subjective probability may be derived, even
if this phenomenon is a ﬁctitious one. In a populational interpretation, it acts as an ‘‘anti-speciﬁcation principle”, which
states that the object is extracted from a virtual system, changing a belief about a speciﬁc object into a belief about a generic
one. It will be considered as a mental model used by a rational agent in order to interpret and give a meaning to his subjec-
tive probabilities through an ‘‘as if” mode. Such a principle changes a psychical world into a physical one, hence increases the
reference level of the system. This involves an epistemic interpretation of subjective probabilities, rather than a pragmatic
one in terms of bets.
The common idea to the objectivation principle and the anti-speciﬁcation principle will be called the ‘‘anti-projection
principle”. For instance, it transforms a hierarchy T1 into a hierarchy T*2:
A fundamental question lies in the possibility to apply the projection principle to a situation where an agent is no more
certain (hierarchy T*n), but uncertain (hierarchy Tn) about the composition of a system of objects. Lewis [20] assumes that it
is possible to combine the subjective and the objective probabilities at the two levels, without giving any clear justiﬁcation of
that assumption (else than to postulate implicitly a ‘‘second order projection principle”). In fact, a direct application of the
projection principle to a two-level hierarchy T2 consists in transforming the upper physical worlds into psychical ones. But
doing so leads the agent to face a schizophrenic structure (he holds the belief that he has contradictory beliefs). A more rel-
evant application suggests that, in order to satisfy the no-schizophrenia principle, the agent applies successively the anti-
projection principle, the collapse principle and the projection principle to get a belief about a speciﬁc object of the system.
The complete operation leads to collapse a physical level and a psychical level.
For instance, for an urn, the transformation is the following by considering successively an urn, a meta-urn, a synthetic
urn and a ball:
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Belief change occurs when a message gives some new insight about the physical system described by the initial belief of
the agent. In a populational interpretation, the message M states some properties which are satisﬁed by the basic objects or
by their subpopulations. More precisely, it deﬁnes the M-compatible objects as the objects whose properties are compatible
with the message. The problem of the agent is to combine the initial belief and the message which are concerned by the same
system in order to form a ﬁnal belief about that system. Traditionally, the message is considered to be true while the initial
belief may be wrong, hence treating asymmetrically the two sources of information. The transformation will be studied in
(possible worlds) semantics, and is given by change rules deﬁned on uncertainty measures. It will appear that the relevant
change rules differ according to the context. Especially, in a probabilistic framework, the Bayes rule is better suited to some
contexts than to others.
The change operations were already studied in the literature in the case of a 1-level hierarchy T1. Two main ‘‘change con-
texts” have been deﬁned in this case:
– ‘‘updating”, where the message relates that some physical operation was operated on the system, able to modify its struc-
ture; as an instance, the message may relate that one has poured acid on a speciﬁc ball, hence that its color has changed; it
may also relate that the red balls have been removed from an urn.
– ‘‘revising”, where the message gives some factual information about the ongoing system, making the initial belief more
precise or contradicting what the agent formerly believed ; as an instance, the message may relate that a speciﬁc ball
is not red; it may also relate that an urn contains no red balls.
For updating, the initial and ﬁnal beliefs are sets of possible worlds (possibly randomized) while the message is a set of
worlds towards which the system has evolved. The updating rules, justiﬁed axiomatically [17,31], are characterized by a ‘lo-
cal’ translation of each world ‘accepted’ by the message (with its weight). In a set-theoretic framework, the ﬁnal belief gath-
ers, from each world of the initial belief (according to a distance between the two worlds), the nearest worlds which are
compatible with the message. In a probabilistic framework, the ﬁnal belief selects the same worlds with weights reallocated
following a ‘‘General Imaging” rule. In fact, since the distance and the allocation rules remain exogenous, one gets a family of
rules to which belongs the Lewis rule [19].
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ﬁnal belief in a (randomized or not) set of possible worlds. The revising rules, axiomatically justiﬁed [1,31], can be charac-
terized by a ‘‘global” translation of the set of accepted worlds together with their weights. In a set-theoretic framework, the
ﬁnal belief selects the set of worlds that is the nearest from the set deﬁned by the initial belief (according to a distance be-
tween initial belief and worlds); when the message does not contradict the initial belief, that nearest set is simply the inter-
section between the prior set and the message. In a probabilistic framework, the ﬁnal belief selects the same worlds with
associated weights (according to an allocation function from initial belief to ﬁnal worlds), in a ‘‘General Conditioning” rule.
Here again, one gets a family of rules including the Bayes rule; but far stronger axiomatic principles are required in order to
justify the restriction of this set of rules to Bayes rule.
The change contexts can be extended to higher level belief hierarchies. Amessage is characterized by a layer s ðs 6 rÞ, which
indicates themaximal layerof theobjects it is speakingabout. But themessage is not completely expressedas abeliefhierarchy.
The context of updating assumes that the systemwas deﬁnitely transformed in its structure and that the message gives some
indicationon the resulting system(oron the transformation itself). For instance, for anurn (r = 1), themessage indicates that the
redballswere removed from it (s = 1) and for ameta-urn (r = 2), that all urns containing redballswere removed (s = 2) or that all
redballswere removed fromall urns (s = 1). Thecontextof revisingassumes thatno transformationwasdoneon the systemand
that themessage just givesmore information about the structureof the system. For instance, for anurn (r = 1), themessage indi-
cates that it containsno redball (s = 1), and for ameta-urn (r = 2), that there is nourncontaining redballs (or containingonly red
balls or containing no red balls) (s = 2) or that there are no red balls in the urns (s = 1).
Introducingbelief hierarchies leads to consider a third context of change, ‘‘focusing”,which involves a preliminary shift in its
reference level (if the hierarchy is non-degenerate). In a context of focusing, the message gives some information about a sub-
systemof layer sðs < rÞwhich, in the populational interpretation, is extracted randomly from thematerial system. For instance,
for anurn (r = 1), a ball is randomlyextractedandamessage relates that it is not red (s = 0). For ameta-urn (r = 2), either anurn is
extracted from it and amessage states that it contains no red balls (s = 1) or a ball is extracted from it in two steps (by sampling
ﬁrst an urn, then a ball in the urn) and a message states that it is not red (s = 0). In that case, the problem of the agent is ﬁrst to
form a derived initial belief about the extracted subsystem, then to revise it according to the message.
For focusing, the message is characterized not only by some information about the subsystem, but by all alternative infor-
mation an observer could give for all types of subsystems. For instance, if a blue ball is extracted from some urn, the infor-
mation may indicate either that it is not red (by opposition to red) or that it is blue (by opposition to yellow or red),
according to some more or less accurate ﬁlter. Focusing has no proper axiomatic justiﬁcation as a change context since it
is considered as decomposable into an epistemic operation of speciﬁcation – associated with a material operation of extrac-
tion of an object – and an epistemic operation of revising about that object. In fact, the epistemic operation of speciﬁcation
associated to the random extraction is precisely the projection principle insofar as it deﬁnes what a random extraction is
supposed to be. An object is ‘‘randomly extracted” from a population if the probability distribution on the basic worlds asso-
ciated with that object is equal to the proportion of the objects of that type in the compound system.
Focusing is generally thought, as in the previous paragraphs, within the populational interpretation of hierarchies. When
it is applied to a 2-level hierarchy, it implies to derive a speciﬁc belief, concerning an object (a ball), from a speciﬁc message
on that object and a generic belief, concerning a population (an urn). But it could also be thought within the causal interpre-
tation of hierarchies. In this case, it would imply to derive a non-conditional belief, concerning a basic property from a factual
message about that property and a causal belief concerning meta-properties. For instance, in the medical example, it would
derive the probability of remaining symptoms (fever and cough) on the reception of a message about some symptoms (no
spots) and a belief concerning the conditional links between diseases (bronchitis, inﬂuenza) and symptoms. Instead of spec-
ifying the belief, focusing consists in this case in deconditioning it. Hence, all the change rules that will be presented in the
following sections through the populational interpretation could also be associated with the causal one.7. Correspondence between change contexts
When coming to the change rules in the three contexts, the main idea is that they are not independent rules and can be
linked at some level. The key suggestion of the paper is that change rules in the different contexts can naturally be derived at
each level from the change rule in the updating context. In fact, the case where the updating rule is really uncontroversial is
only for a certain belief hierarchy T*n. Since the message gives information about the physical part of the hierarchical belief,
hence about the objects which are excluded, objective probabilities are changed in consequence through a mechanical way
(see Section 7). Then, as will be shown, the other rules can be deduced by shifting the relevant layer of the hierarchy and by
adapting the message. The equivalence between change rules are given by ‘‘translation principles”, which apply the col-
lapse, projection and anti-projection principles to change contexts.
The ﬁrst case considers an agent who revises an uncertain belief or focuses on a certain belief. It is assumed that he builds
mentally a virtual ‘‘associated situation” related to a context of updating in order to solve his problem. To each belief hier-
archy T = T(n  1), the anti-projection principle associates a belief hierarchy T0 = T*n called the ‘‘associated belief hierarchy”.
Consider ﬁrst a revising message M for belief hierarchy T, which states that only M-compatible objects are indeed possible.
Let M0 be the ‘‘associated message” stating that in the belief hierarchy T0, only M-compatible objects are ﬁnally present. The
translation principle TP1 states that the hierarchy T0 updated by messageM0 and projected is the same than the hierarchy T
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reference one (s = r  1) in belief hierarchy T0 which states that an M-compatible object has been extracted. The translation
principle TP1 states that the hierarchy T0 leading to a focusing message M00 gives the same result than the hierarchy T0 up-
dated by message M0 and projected.
Consider the simplest sub-case of associated situations, which was already analyzed:
– updating is achieved on a 2-level hierarchy T*2, the 2-layer message being ‘‘the red balls have been removed from the
(certain) urn”;
– revising is achieved on a 1-level hierarchy T1, the 1-layer message being ‘‘the speciﬁc ball is not red”;
– focusing is achieved on a 2-level hierarchy T*2 and results in a 1-level structure T1, the 1-layer message being ‘‘a ball
was extracted from the (certain) urn and is not red”.
When applying the translation principle TP1, the relations between the three contexts are given by Scheme G1a, where
the levels of beliefs grow vertically.
Consider now another sub-case where the associated situations are globally shifted upwards for one level:
– updating is achieved on a 3-level hierarchy T*3, the 2-layer message being ‘‘the urns containing red balls were removed
from the (certain) meta-urn”;
– revising is achieved on a 2-level hierarchy T2, the 1-layer message being ‘‘the speciﬁc (uncertain) urn contains no red
balls”;
– focusing is achieved on a 3-level hierarchy T*3, and results in a 2-level hierarchy T2, the 1-layer message being ‘‘an urn
was extracted from the (certain) meta-urn and contains not red balls”.
When applying again the translation principle TP1, the relations between the three contexts are given by Scheme G1b.
The second case considers an agent who updates an uncertain belief. This will be done again by using a translation prin-
ciple, but this time between two updating operations on different beliefs. To each belief hierarchy T = T(n  1), the anti-pro-
jection principle associates a belief hierarchy T0 = T*n called the ‘‘associated belief hierarchy”. LetM be a message of updating
of the belief hierarchy T which states that only M-compatible objects are ﬁnally present. Let M0 be the ‘‘associated message”
stating that in the belief hierarchy T0, onlyM-compatible objects are ﬁnally present. The translation principle TP2 states that
the hierarchy T0 ﬁrst updated by message M0 and then projected is the same than the hierarchy T updated by message M.
As the simplest sub-case, consider an initial T2 hierarchy:Scheme G1a.
Scheme G1b.
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the urns of the meta-urn”;
– updating can be achieved then on a 2-level hierarchy T2, the message being ‘‘the red balls were removed from the
uncertain urn”.
When applying the translation principle TP2, the relations between the two contexts are given by Scheme G2.
The third case considers an agent who focuses on an uncertain belief. It applies to an uncertain system of type Tn or con-
cerns a subsystem at a layer k not just beneath the reference one r = n  1. Then two operations are needed:
– to interpret the Tn hierarchy into a T*(n + 1) one,
– to collapse the T*(n + 1) hierarchy into a T(k + 1) one, before being able to apply the translation principle, which requires a
difference of one level exactly.
As the simplest sub-case, consider a T2 hierarchy:
– updating is achieved on a T*2 hierarchy, after having interpreted the initial T2 hierarchy in a T*3 one and collapsed it,
the message being ‘‘the red balls have been removed from the urn”;
– focusing is achieved on the initial 2-level structure T2 and results in a 1-level hierarchy T1, the 1-layer message being ‘‘a
ball was extracted from the uncertain urn and is not red”;
– focusing in two steps is moreover achieved on the 3-level hierarchy T*3, the 1-layer message being ‘‘an urn was
extracted from the meta-urn, then a ball was extracted from this urn, and it is not red”.
When applying the translation principle TP1, the relations between the contexts of updating and focusing are given by
Scheme G3, where again the levels of beliefs grow vertically:
The fourth unsolved case considers an agent who revises a certain belief hierarchy T*n. In fact, this operation is undeter-
mined since the belief about the material universe is now certain. Two possibilities are open. If the message conﬁrms the
initial belief, the last is unchanged. If the message contradicts the initial belief, a change can be deﬁned only by considering
a distance between worlds.Scheme G2.
Scheme G3.
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Consider a (r + 1)-level belief hierarchy with reference layer r and an updating message on the set of worlds of this layer.
Some basic principles of updating can be applied. If some r-world of the initial belief is compatible with the message, this r-
world is kept alike in the ﬁnal belief. If some r-world of the initial belief is incompatible with the message, one considers the
‘‘nearest” r-worlds from that world compatible with the message, with an appropriate distance. The level (r + 1) is un-
changed, be it set-theoretic or probabilistic, but the weight of a suppressed initial world has to be reallocated between ﬁnal
worlds. However, this procedure (i.e. the imaging method) remains undetermined because the distance and the allocation
rule are generally exogenous to the model.
If one considers ﬁrst a 1-level hierarchy T1 and an updating message ‘‘one has poured acid on the ball”, the imaging meth-
od does not give any computable solution in order to know on which worlds the weights of the initial red world should be
transferred. But of course, the message ‘‘somebody painted the ball in green” is sufﬁcient.
However, if one considers a 2-level hierarchy T*2 and a message ‘‘the red balls have been removed from the urn”, the
imaging method can be applied with a precise and uncontroversial notion of local distance. It coincides with Bayes rule when
the 1-worlds are probability distributions. Indeed, this is mathematically justiﬁed by the physical change of the population:
Bayes rule just expresses the straightforward fact that, in case of such a physical change, the proportion of any two 0-worlds
compatible with the message is kept constant. If red balls are removed from an urn, the respective proportion of yellow and
blue balls does not change. This is a matter of fact, on which can rely change of belief. In other words, imaging consists here
in transferring the weight of the unique initial probability distribution to the nearest one (whose initial probability was
zero), which happens to be the one resulting from the application of the Bayes rule to the initial one.
If one considers a 2-level hierarchy T2 and a same message Mu, the only difference is that the belief on the urn is uncer-
tain. The Scheme G3 (Section 5) leads to apply the same previous straightforward reasoning to the certain meta-urn obtained
by applying the anti-projection principle to this T2 hierarchy. Updating the interpreted hierarchy T*3 by a messageM0u which
tells ‘‘the red balls were removed from all urns” and projecting the resulting structure (translation principle TP2) leads to the
‘‘minimal method”. It consists in transferring the weight of each basic initial distribution to the nearest ones, i.e. to the cor-
responding distributions revised according to Bayes rule. Moreover, the probabilities affected by the 2-worlds to the 1-
worlds get unchanged since the physical transformation has no effect on the initial belief. However, if a 1-world is incom-
patible with the message, its weight is reallocated proportionally to the remaining ones, a principle conventionally justiﬁed
by the fact that changes in the external world never result in an empty world : the belief of the agent describes only pro-
portions of types of objects within a population, not its absolute size. Finally, if any 1-world is incompatible with the mes-
sage, the ﬁnal distribution is undeﬁned. The minimal method can be applied to each kind of 2-level hierarchy T2 facing the
message Mu.
For a distribution of distributions, the ‘‘minimal rule” excludes the red balls from the possible urns, changes their compo-
sition accordingly through the Bayes rule and keeps the beliefs about them if possible. Two cases have to be distinguished,
according to the fact that a possible urn is composed or not exclusively of red balls:
For a distribution of events, it can be shown that the ‘‘Dempster rule” [23] corresponds to the minimal method, since it just
eliminates the red balls from the urns (even if two cases are again theoretically possible):
For a family of distributions, it can be shown that the ‘‘Fagin–Halpern rule” [11,8] corresponds to the minimal method,
since it eliminates the red balls from the urn and revises their composition through the Bayes rule:
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applied to the equivalent distribution of events, given by S02:9. Revising rules
Consider again a (r + 1) belief hierarchy with reference layer r, and a revising message on the set of worlds of this layer.
Some basic principles of revising can be applied. If there exists some r-worlds which are compatible with the message, these
r-worlds are the only ones to be kept in the ﬁnal belief. If there is no r-world compatible with the message, one considers the
‘‘nearest” set of r-worlds from the initial one compatible with the message, with an appropriate distance. Moreover, the sub-
jective beliefs about the remaining r-world are adjusted according to the fact that level (r + 1) is set-theoretic or probabilistic
(allocation rule). Here again, this procedure (i.e. the conditioning method), remains generally undetermined because there is
no epistemic way to justify a precise distance and allocation rule. But some computational solutions can be obtained through
the belief hierarchy model.
If one considers ﬁrst a 1-level hierarchy T1 and a message ‘‘the ball is not red”, the traditional solution is to apply Bayes
rule, but this rule has been justiﬁed only by pure algebraic or pragmatic reasons. The translation principle offers then a new
epistemic, justiﬁcation of Bayes rule. Indeed, if one considers the Scheme G1a and the previous updating rule, revising is
achieved by Bayes rule, and inherits the straightforward character of the updating rule. This justiﬁcation of Bayes rule is
purely epistemic since it requires only the epistemic interpretation of subjective belief along the principles of anti-projection
and projection and the previous physical reasoning which justiﬁes the updating rule.
If one considers now a 2-level hierarchy T*2 and a message ‘‘the urn does not contain red balls”, it does not lead to any
precise solution. Indeed, if in the initial belief the urn contains red balls, the structure remains unchanged. If not, the tra-
ditional Bayes rule prevents from dealing with messages of zero probability. If one uses however an ‘‘extended Bayes rule”
dealing with zero probability messages [31], the unitary weight would be reallocated to all the distributions giving zero
probability to red balls, but a precise allocation rule is missing. The translation principle does not help much in this situa-
tion, since the same conclusions of no change or undetermined re-allocation would apply to a meta-urn containing only one
urn.
If one considers a 2-level hierarchy T2 and the same message, applied this time to an uncertain urn, the translation prin-
ciple TP1 justiﬁes the ‘‘maximal method”. Indeed, this rule results from Scheme G1b and the previous rule of updating:
revising is achieved by applying the Bayes rule to an imaginary meta-urn containing several urns, then by applying the pro-
jection principle. This results in keeping only the 1-worlds (urns) compatible with the message and, if the second level is
probabilistic, to revise the probabilities at this level according to the Bayes rule; the values affected to the 0-worlds by a
1-world have never to be changed. The maximal method can be applied to each kind of type T2 belief hierarchies facing
the message, under the general assumption that some 1-world at least satisﬁes the message:
For a distribution of distributions, the ‘‘maximal rule” eliminates the possible urns with red balls and changes the beliefs
on the remaining urns according to Bayes rule:
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method since it eliminates the possible urns with red balls and changes the probabilities about the remaining ones (one is
assumed to exist) according to Bayes rule:
For a family of distributions, it can be shown that the ‘‘Gilboa-Schmeidler rule” [14] gives the same result than applying the
maximal method when some urns satisfy the message, since it keeps the urns with the lowest proportion of red balls and
revises them according to Bayes rule, hence forming a restricted family :Remark. When no initial 1-world satisﬁes the message, the general solution, as for the 2-level hierarchy T*2, consists in the
reactivation of all the possible 1-worlds which satisfy it, which leaves an under determination of the allocation rule in the
case of a probabilistic level. The Gilboa–Schmeidler rule proposes an interesting alternative in the case of a set-theoretic level
by selecting the 1-worlds with the lowest proportion of 0-worlds compatible with the message. The relevance of this rule is
reinforced by the fact that Gilboa–Schmeidler have shown that this rule is equivalent to the Dempster conditioning rule [23]
applied to the equivalent distribution of events, given by S02 :10. Focusing rules
Consider again a (r + 1)-level hierarchy with reference layer r, and a focusing message on a set of worlds of layers s < r.
There is no general basic principles of focusing at hand since this change operation appears only in the context of a belief
hierarchy, even of course if it has yet largely been identiﬁed and discussed by several authors [9]. But the previous principles
lead to formulate the relevant change rules as follows.
If one considers ﬁrst a 2-level hierarchy T*2 and a messageMf ‘‘a ball has been extracted from the urn and is not red”, then
the application of the layer translation principle as described in the Scheme G1a and of the previous rule of updating for T*2
structures, lead to apply Bayes rule into the projected belief hierarchy of type T1.
If one considers now a 2-level hierarchy T2 and the same messageMf , applied this time to an uncertain urn, then the rel-
evant method is the ‘‘synthetic method”. It can be obtained by the sequence of epistemic operations described in Scheme G3
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which has for effect to change the probabilities of the basic properties (colors) accordingly with those of the meta-properties
(urns), but only for the speciﬁc ball under consideration. The synthetic method can be applied to each kind of 2-level hier-
archy T2 when facing the message Mf .
For a distribution of distributions, the ‘‘synthetic rule” is obtained by constructing the synthetic urn and revising it with
Bayes rule according to the message:Remark. On the above scheme, only basic properties of the initial structure are represented in the ﬁnal structure, but in fact,
the basic worlds of the ﬁnal structures are a product of the 0-layer and the 1-layer worlds of the initial structure. It is easy
then to see that this rule corresponds to the Bayes inversion formula, as shown in Appendix B: the message about the ball
gives information about the urn from which it was extracted.
For a distribution of events, the ‘‘Jaffray rule” [16] even if hard to compute, corresponds to the synthetic method since it
can be proved that it gives the values that can be associated with an updating of a synthetic urn by the message for the prob-
abilities of the remaining colors and of the urns:
For a family of distributions, the ‘‘Fagin–Halpern rule” is again the relevant rule as it is for updating (applying the min-
imal method), since the message about the ball extracted gives no information about the type of urn from which it is
extracted:11. Synthetic view of change rules and contexts
The three preceding sections were devoted to the justiﬁcations of the usual change rules for sophisticated uncertainty
measures. Indeed, in the case of a 2-level hierarchy T2, the following table was progressively built:Hierarchy ContextRevising Updating FocusingDistribution of distributions Maximal Minimal Synthetic
Distribution of events Geometric Dempster Jaffray
Family of distributions Gilboa–Schmeidler Fagin–Halpern Fagin–HalperBy using the same kind of reasoning from Schemes G1a, G1b, G2, G3, it is possible moreover to construct the following
table, associating hierarchies, contexts and change methods for the simplest hierarchies:
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T*2: certain urn (r = 1, s = 1) Undetermined Bayes G1a Bayes G1a
T2: uncertain urn (r = 1, s = 1) Maximal G1b Minimal G2 Synthetic G3
T*3: certain meta-urn (r = 2, s = 1) Undetermined Minimal G2 Synthetic G3
T*3: certain meta-urn (r = 2, s = 2) undetermined Maximal G1b Maximal G1bFormalization and generalization to Tn and T*n hierarchies is an open technical work, which should not raise any speciﬁc
new philosophical problem.
12. Resiliency and learning
When messages are expressed on the same or a higher level than beliefs, belief change may be complex to compute but
does not lead to any philosophical puzzle. When an agent receives a speciﬁc or generic message about a (respectively) spe-
ciﬁc or generic system, he is induced to change his initial belief, whether the message contradicts it or not. For instance,
when he is informed that a ball is not red, he changes his opinion about its color; if he is informed that an urn contains
no red ball, he changes his opinion about the composition of the urn. When an agent receives a generic message about a
speciﬁc system (a ‘‘downward message”), his belief will also be compelled to change. For instance, when he is informed that
he has drawn the ball from an urn which does not contain any red balls, he will not believe that this ball is red. In these cases,
the message gives some information precisely related to the reference level of the system: the change is directly implied by
the message. But a more complex epistemological problem appears when an agent receives an ‘‘upward message”, i.e. has a
generic belief and receives a speciﬁc message. For instance, if he is informed that a ball extracted randomly from an urn is
red, should he change his belief about the composition of the urn? In that case, the message gives information about a sub-
system of the whole system and does not directly imply any change of belief.
The probabilistic instance of this general problem has often been discussed in the literature. When holding a precise prob-
abilistic belief, the probability distribution is compatible with any speciﬁc message whose initial probability is not zero.
Hence there seems to be no reason to change it. Probability judgments are generally considered as irrefutable as long as
the message does not contradict them. This property, called ‘‘resiliency” by Skyrms [25], is also vindicated by Lewis [20]
in the following terms: ‘‘to the extent that uncertainty about outcomes is based on certainty about their chances, it is a sta-
ble, resilient sort of uncertainty – new evidence won’t get rid of it”. The only limit to resiliency admitted by Lewis is this:
once you get some precise information about a speciﬁc object, you can give up the chance to which you did believe. But this
concerns only this speciﬁc object in an extreme case: you never learn anything about generic chances themselves this way.
However, when observing a thousand draws of blue and yellow balls in an urn where red balls are considered as possible,
there is a strong intuition even for probability experts in favor of changing the initial belief on the composition of the urn. In
fact, an agent can never hold some absolute certainty about chances. In a normal situation, a rational agent just takes as
granted some objective probabilities, perhaps given by science or by experts, and applies the projection principle in order
to form his own subjective belief. But in presence of what is perceived as an anomaly, he will consider the possibility of
an alternative probability distribution. Once the agent has formed an uncertain belief about the system, it may be modiﬁed
since the weight accorded to alternative views of the system can now be reinforced or weakened by the newmessage. Hence
resiliency can have a more general limit than the one pointed by Lewis.
It is possible to give a rational account of this strong intuition, and to explain the dynamic of probabilistic learning, by
using the present belief hierarchy model. The problem arises precisely in a focusing context for a certain belief T*n. One as-
sumes that facing an anomaly, an agent can always decide to add uncertainty over this certain belief. But this uncertainty
will not be handled by subjective belief over subjective beliefs, since this is discarded by the no-schizophrenia principle. In-
stead, the agent will transform the T*n hierarchy into a T*(n + 1), by adding mentally a virtual meta-objective level, and the
message will indicate then what objective distribution is the most probable.
For instance, instead of considering a unique possible urn, the agent considers a virtual meta-urn with several urns (cor-
responding to several possible distributions for that urn) and the ball which was extracted gives some information about the
relevant belief. Focusing leads then to apply the synthetic rule: the ball which was extracted in two times gives an insight on
the urn which was selected, as expressed by the Bayes inversion formula (see Appendix B). When starting from a T*3 struc-
ture concerning a real meta-urn, the synthetic rule does not lead to change the generic belief about the meta-urn and the
urns it contains, since the change concerns only the speciﬁc ball that has been extracted: it tells what is the new probability
that this ball was extracted from such urn; indeed, the next ball will be extracted from any alternative urn with the
probabilities given by the initial belief. But in the present situation, the starting point is a T2 structure and the meta-urn
is a virtual one, constructed in order to interpret the subjective probabilities about one single uncertain urn. Hence the next
ball will necessarily be extracted from the same real urn. Hence, the synthetic rule leads in this case to change the generic
belief about the real urn from which all the balls are extracted. This explains how factual evidence leads to generic learning.
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changes. This learning process can even be cumulative when considering a sequence of messages and eventually converges
towards the ‘‘true” belief, especially the true probability distribution if any. But it supposes at least that the agent is able to
consider the ‘‘true” belief among the alternative ones. For instance, the probability that the ball is extracted from an urn con-
taining no red balls grows as long as the messages, concerning balls successively extracted from the same urn, tell that the
ball is not red. But of course, it falls to zero in case of a message telling that the ball is red. This learning process relies heavily
on the assumption that the second order uncertainty of the agent is interpreted through the anti-projection principle in
terms of a belief over alternative virtual objective systems, instead of an interpretation in terms of subjective beliefs over
subjective beliefs. Hence one can draw the following conclusion: it is the combination of doubt about the objective world
and of no doubt about what an agent believes (no schizophrenia), which allows him to change what he believes.
Appendix 1. The no schizophrenia principle
In epistemic logic, in semantics, a (one agent) Kripke structure is deﬁned by a set of worlds W, an event E being repre-
sented by a subset of worlds. In each world, a non-empty accessibility domain H(w) delimitates the subset of worlds undis-
tinguishable by the agent from the world w. Believing an event E is then realized in an subset of worlds denoted B(E) and
deﬁned by: BðEÞ ¼ fw : HðwÞ# Eg. If B is the usual belief operator, an ‘‘exact” belief operator B can be deﬁned by
BðEÞ ¼ fw : HðwÞ ¼ Eg. Several models of epistemic logics are deﬁned, and relate semantic properties of the accessibility rela-
tions and syntactic properties of the belief operator, for instance within the standard S5 model, logical omniscience, positive
and negative introspection.
In the framework of set-theoretic belief hierarchies, it is also possible to build belief operators and to associate them to
some basic properties:
Deﬁnitions. Let Rk be the set-theoretic relation between any two layers k and k  1 (cf. Section 1). One deﬁnes the
accessibility domain of a world wk of layer k by: HðwkÞ ¼ fwk1;RðwkÞ ¼ 1g. The belief event BkðEÞ is deﬁned semantically by:
BkðEÞ ¼ fwk : HðwkÞ# Eg, where E is an event of layer k  1.
Hence, Bk is an event on which believing operators of layer k + 1 can be deﬁned. For instance for a two-level structure:B2ðB1ðEÞÞ ¼ fw2 : fHðw1Þ# Eg for all w1#Hðw2Þg:
An ‘‘exact belief” event is deﬁned accordingly by:BkðEÞ ¼ fwk : HðwkÞ ¼ Eg:
Hence, considering the construction of belief hierarchies, exact belief events are always single worlds.
Exact belief events of order k + 1 may be deﬁned over exact belief events of order k as previously.
In syntax, let S be a belief hierarchy structure of level nP k, a belief operator may be deﬁned at each world wk by:S;wk JBkðEÞ iff wk# E:
The exact belief operator can be deﬁned from the belief operator by the following deﬁnition:BðEÞ def BðEÞ^ ½BðFÞ $ ðE ! FÞ; 8F:
By convention, we will forget the indexes and note B(B. . .(B(E)))). . . with k iterations of B the event BkðBk1ð. . . ðB1ðEÞÞÞÞ . . .
(and the same for the exact belief events).
Properties. The three following properties, which remind the corresponding standard epistemic logic properties, are postulates
supposed to be satisﬁed in the framework of set-theoretic belief hierarchies of order n:Positive introspection: BðEÞ ! BðBðEÞÞ.
Negative introspection: :BðEÞ ! Bð:BðEÞÞ.
Logical omniscience: BðEÞ&ðE# FÞ ! BðFÞ.
In fact, Positive introspection is equivalent to the ‘‘extension principle”, already introduced in Section 4. Negative introspection
results from observing that applying Positive introspection to any of the k-level belief hierarchies where B(E) is false leads to
k + 1-level belief hierarchies where the fact that B(E) is false is believed. Logical omniscience results from the semantic construc-
tion of belief hierarchies.
Theorem. If the belief operator satisﬁes Logical omniscience, Positive and Negative introspection, the exact belief operator satisﬁes
the following properties:Inclusion: BðEÞ ! BðEÞ.
Unicity: BðEÞ ! :BðFÞ; 8F – E.
Exact positive introspection: BðEÞ ! BðBðEÞÞ.
No schizophrenia: BðBðEÞ v BðFÞÞ ¼ ;; 8F – E; BðEÞ– ;; BðFÞ– ;.
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they coincide. Positive introspection asserts that if an agent believes exactly something, he believes exactly that he believes it
exactly. No schizophrenia asserts that an agent cannot believe exactly either of two different exact beliefs. Note that logical omni-
science, i.e. the fact that the agent believes exactly all consequences of what he believes exactly, is no longer satisﬁed.
Proofs. Inclusion and Unicity are trivial, considering the deﬁnitions of the belief and exact belief operators.
Exact positive introspection (in semantics)BðBðEÞÞ ¼ fw=HðwÞ ¼ fw0=Hðw0Þ ¼ Egg
BðEÞ ¼ fw=HðwÞ ¼ EgConsider w0 2 BðEÞ, then Hðw0Þ ¼ E and w0 2 HðwÞ; 8w 2 BðBðEÞÞ. By Positive and Negative introspection, if w0 2 HðwÞ, then
Hðw0Þ ¼ HðwÞ. Hence w 2 BðBðEÞÞ.
No schizophrenia (in semantics)BðBðEÞ v BðFÞÞ ¼ fw=HðwÞ ¼ fw0=Hðw0Þ ¼ E or Hðw0Þ ¼ FÞ:
Considerw 2 BðBðEÞ v BðFÞÞ. H(w) containsw0 such that H(w0) = E andw00 such that H(w00) = F. Positive and negative introspec-
tion, if w0 2 H(w), then H(w0) = H(w) and if w00 2 H(w), then H(w00) = H(w), which is impossible.
No schizophrenia (in syntax).
Consider E– F, hence by Unicity, BðEÞ– BðFÞ and BðEÞ v BðFÞ – BðEÞ and BðEÞ v BðFÞ– BðFÞ. Assume that BðBðEÞ v BðFÞÞ;
BðEÞ – ;; BðFÞ – ;.
On one side, by Exact positive introspection: BðBðBðEÞ v BðFÞÞÞ, and by Inclusion: BðBðBðEÞ v BðFÞÞÞ.
On the other side, by Inclusion: B(B(E) v B(F)), then by Positive introspection and Logical omniscience: B(B(B(E)) v B(B(F)).
But, since by hypothesis BðEÞ – ; and BðFÞ– ;, B(E)– B((B(E) v B(F)) and – ;; BðEÞ– BððBðEÞ v BðFÞÞ. Then, by Unicity and
Logical omniscience : B(:B(B(E) v B(F)) v :B(B(E) v B(F))) = B(:B(B(E) v B(F)). Gathering both sides and applying Logical
omniscience, one gets Bð;Þ which by deﬁnition is equal to ;. It follows a contradiction. h
The belief structures can be extended to probabilistic hierarchies.
Let Rk the probabilistic relation between any two layers k and k  1 (cf. Section 1). It deﬁnes a probability distribution Pk
in each world wk. It follows that an event of layer k  1 has a probability in each world wk. However, the probabilities can be
combined from one level to the next one. Hence, any event E of layer 0 has a unique probability at upper layer n:
PnðPn1ð. . . ðP1ðEÞÞÞÞ. . ., written conventionally P(P(P(. . .P(E))). . .
For instance, consider a two-level structure where the worlds arewj at layer 0, v i at layer 1 and w at layer 2, and the prob-
abilities are pij at level 1 and qi at level 2, the probability of an event E is:P2ðP1ðEÞÞ ¼
X
wi2E
pijqi:In probabilistic terms, the properties are the following:
– Introspection: if P(E) = a, P(P(E) = a) = 1.
– Monotony: if E ! F; PðEÞ 6 PðFÞ.
– Comparative non-schizophrenia: if P(P(E) = 1) = 1, then P(P(F) = 1) = 0, 8E– F.
– Numerical non-schizophrenia: if P(P(E) = a) > 0, then P(P(E) = b) = 0, 8a – b.
Positive introspection is expressed as in a set-theoretic framework, but with precise probabilities. Negative introspection
is in fact represented by the same property. Monotony is equivalent to logical omniscience. No-schizophrenia axiom is ex-
pressed in a set-theoretic language by comparing two different events (an agent cannot believe with probability one in two
different events). Numerical non-schizophrenia is an extension to numerical values for a single event (an agent cannot be-
lieve in two different values of a given event).
When two events have different probabilistic supports, non-schizophrenia can be proved in the same way that in a set-
theoretic language. When two events have same probabilistic supports, value non-schizophrenia can be proved from intro-
spection and monotony:
The event P(E) = a implies the event P(P(E) = a) = 1 by introspection, which implies itself the event P(P(E) = b) = 0, 8b– a.
As, by assumption, P(P(E) = a) > 0, it follows by monotony that P(P(P(E) = b) = 0) > 0. If, by assumption, P(P(E) = b) > 0, it fol-
lows by introspection that P(P(P(E) = b) = 0) = 0. A contradiction arises, leading to numerical non-schizophrenia.
Appendix 2. The synthetic rule and the Bayes inversion formula
An agent considers the following belief about some urn:
– he imagines several alternative urns Ui containing balls Bj with objective probabilities PrðBj=UiÞ;
– he adopts subjective probabilities PrðUiÞ about these urns.
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X
t
PrðBj=UiÞPrðUiÞ ¼
X
i
PrðBj \ UiÞ:When receiving a message M about an extracted ball, the agent’s belief becomes:P^rðBj=MÞ ¼ PrðBj \MÞPrðMÞ ¼
X
i
PrðBj \ Ui \MÞ
PrðMÞ :This corresponds to the synthetic rule.
On the other hand, when receiving the messageM on the extracted ball, the agent revises simultaneously the probability
of the urn from which it may be extracted and of the probability of the balls in each urn:^^PrðUi=MÞ ¼ PrðUi \MÞPrðMÞ ;
^^PrðBj=Ui \MÞ ¼ PrðBj \ Ui \MÞPrðUi \MÞ :Collapsing both layers in order to compute the probability of the ball extracted, one gets:^^PrðBj=MÞ ¼
X
i
PrðBj=Ui \MÞPrðUi=MÞ ¼
X
i
PrðBj \ Ui \MÞ
PrðMÞ :The two paths lead to the same value. Hence, our analysis proves that the Bayes Inversion formula suits to a focusing con-
text when the agent is uncertain about the urn from which the ball was extracted, and is in accordance with the synthetic
rule.
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